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Abstract
Toy models are highly idealized and extremely simple models. Although
they are omnipresent across scientific disciplines, toy models are a surpris-
ingly under-appreciated subject in the philosophy of science. The main
philosophical puzzle regarding toy models is that it is an unsettled ques-
tion what the epistemic goal of toy modeling is. One promising proposal
for answering this question is the claim that the epistemic goal of toy mod-
els is to provide individual scientists with understanding. The aim of this
paper is to precisely articulate and to defend this claim. In particular, we
will distinguish between autonomous and embedded toy models, and, then,
argue that important examples of autonomous toy models are sometimes
best interpreted to provide how-possibly understanding, while embedded
toy models yield how-actually understanding, if certain conditions are sat-
isfied.
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1 Introduction
Across the natural and social sciences, researchers construct very simple and highly
idealized models, which the experts in a particular field of inquiry can cognitively
grasp with ease. Following common terminology from the sciences, we call such
models “toy models” – a term that is not meant to have belittling or derogatory
connotations. Paradigmatic examples of toy models include the Ising model in
physics, the Lotka-Volterra model in population ecology, and the Schelling model
in the social sciences (see, for instance, Hartmann [1999]; Sugden [2000]; Weisberg
[2013]). A useful characterization of toy models appeals to three essential features:
(1) models of this type are strongly idealized in that they often include both
Aristotelian and Galilean idealizations (see Section 2.1 for details regarding this
familiar distinction), (2) such models are extremely simple in that they represent
a small number of causal factors (or, more generally speaking, of explanatory
factors) responsible for the target phenomenon, and (3) these models refer to a
target phenomenon (as opposed to, for instance, models of data; see Frigg and
Hartmann [2012]).
To be clear from the start, we do not claim that there is a sharp boundary
between toy models and other models. Instead of a sharp distinction, there seems
to be a continuum of models with respect to their degree of simplicity and, in-
dependently, their degree of idealization. If one compares toy models with more
complex models representing a large number of causal factors responsible for the
target phenomenon (such as complex models in climate science), then toy models
are located at the ‘simple end’ of the spectrum. If one contrasts toy models with
less idealized models (that is, models involving fewer idealized and more approx-
imately true assumptions), then toy models are located at the ‘strongly idealized
end’ of a continuous spectrum. Our characterization of toy models as simple and
highly idealized does, of course, permit the existence of (i) simple and less ideal-
ized, (ii) complex and highly idealized, and (iii) complex and less idealized models.
In sum, the concept of a toy model is a vague concept. However, vagueness does
not exclude that there are clear core examples of what is in the extension of a
concept. We will discuss some core examples of toy models in this paper.
Idealizations and models have been major topics in the recent philosophy of
science (Morgan and Morrison [1999]; Bailer-Jones [2009]; Frigg and Hartmann
[2012]). It is, however, a curious fact that philosophers of science have not devoted
sufficient attention to toy models, despite their apparently central role in many sci-
ences (notable exceptions include Hartmann [1999]; Sugden [2000]; Strevens [2008];
Bailer-Jones [2009]; Gru¨ne-Yanoff [2009], [2013]; Weisberg [2013]). Toy models are
deeply puzzling because their strongly idealized and simple nature raises hard ques-
tions: to what end do scientists construct toy models? Why should one have any
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confidence in the claim that strongly idealized and simple models can be used for
modeling any real social and natural phenomena? Or, even more provocatively,
why should one believe that toy models are anything more than ‘mathematized
science fiction’, giving us no more clues about real world phenomena than non-
mathematized fairy tales?
As a pessimistic response, one could be tempted to think that toy models are
not very useful, because they cannot represent real (or actual) phenomena. To
motivate this sort of scepticism, suppose that explanation and prediction are two
central goals of modeling in science. We know as a matter of fact that toy models
– as idealized models – are literally false of their intended target systems; or, put
in semantic terms, toy models clearly do not accurately map onto their targets
(for instance, because a toy model is not isomorphic to its target, supposing that
isomorphism is required for representation). Being false is a feature that, at least
prima facie and according to standard accounts of explanation, undermines the
explanatory character of a model, as the explanans of an explanation is required
to be (approximately) true.1 Similar worries emerge with respect to the predictive
use of toy models: the majority of toy models is not suited for precise quantitative
predictions. Why should anyone trust the predictions generated by toy models, if
one knows that these predictions rest on false assumptions?
Opposing a pessimistic attitude towards toy models, some philosophers have
recently claimed that the epistemic goal of toy modeling is to obtain understanding
of natural and social phenomena (Hartmann [1998]; De Regt and Dieks [2005]). By
virtue of their simplicity, toy models enable scientists to retain a sort of epistemic
access to scientific models (and the mathematical procedures for solving these
models). The simplicity of toy models distinguishes them from other kinds of
models – for instance, from complex models that can only be solved via computer
simulation, such as climate models.2 Is the claim that toy models – being idealized
models – yield understanding really warranted? Are toy models appropriate for
achieving understanding? And if so, what kind of understanding do scientists get
from toy models? The main goal of this paper is to answer these questions by (1)
distinguishing two kinds of toy models, (2) developing an account of understanding
that is adequate for toy models, and (3) determining whether different kinds of
toy models are apt for different kinds of understanding.
According to an alternative approach in the recent literature, simple and ideal-
ized models are portrayed as minimal models (for instance, Strevens [2008]; Gru¨ne-
Yanoff [2009], [2013]; Weisberg [2013]; Batterman and Rice [2014]). However, al-
1But there are exceptions such as Cartwright ([1983], chapter 8).
2Hartmann ([1999]) contrasts toy models with complex models that are solved with computer
simulations. He considers the latter to be “black boxes” for the individual scientist. Similarly,
Humphreys ([2004]) highlights a contrast between simple models and the epistemic opacity of
computer simulations.
4
though we are convinced that some toy models may be interpreted as minimal
models, we will argue that other toy models are not best understood in terms of
minimal models. We shall return to the minimalist interpretation (Section 4.2).
The plan of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we present the distinction
between embedded and autonomous toy models. In Section 3, we elaborate an
account of understanding (the refined simple view). Our account of understanding
is inspired by Strevens’ ([2013]) “simple view” of understanding, and Bailer-Jones’
([1997]) naturalistic account of the “subjective component” of understanding (epis-
temic access). The refined simple view explicates two kinds of understanding:
how-actually understanding and how-possibly understanding. In Section 4, we
argue that (i) embedded toy models yield how-actually understanding, if certain
conditions hold (Section 4.1), (ii) standard accounts of idealizations – such as Mc-
Mullin’s strategy, minimalism and dispositionalism – do not support the claim that
all autonomous toy models provide how-actually understanding (Section 4.2), and
(iii) there are some autonomous toy models that one best interprets as yielding
how-possibly understanding (Section 4.3).3
2 Embedded and Autonomous Toy Models
To analyze whether and how toy models yield scientific understanding, it is use-
ful to introduce a distinction between two kinds of toy models: embedded and
autonomous toy models. We will first illustrate the concept of an embedded toy
model (in Section 2.1), and then turn to an illustration of autonomous toy models
(in Section 2.2). We conclude this section with a brief qualification regarding the
heterogeneity of autonomous toy models (in Section 2.3).
2.1 Embedded toy models
Above we introduced toy models as models of phenomena. However, some toy
models are also models in a different sense of the term “model”: they are also
models of a theory. This observation will permit us to introduce a central distinc-
tion between embedded and autonomous toy models.
Some toy models are embedded into an empirically well confirmed theory. More
precisely, embedded toy models are models of an empirically well confirmed frame-
work theory, while autonomous toy models – to which we will turn below – are
3One also finds numerous material toy models in chemistry and in the life sciences, such
as croquet ball models of molecules, Watson and Crick’s metal model of DNA, and simple
model organisms (see Meinel [2004]). In this paper, we restrict the focus to toy models qua
mathematical models of phenomena. A comparative analysis of mathematical and material toy
models is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this paper.
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not. This characterization of an embedded toy model relies on a familiar distinc-
tion from the philosophical literature on models and model theory in mathematics:
namely, the distinction between (i) a (framework) theory and (ii) models of the
framework theory (see Hartmann [1998]; Bailer-Jones [2009]; Frigg and Hartmann
[2012], Sect. 1.3). In model theory, a theory is a set of uninterpreted sentences.
When model theory is used to express a framework theory, this set of sentences
includes, most prominently, the framework theory’s abstract calculus and its gen-
eral laws. Models of a framework theory are taken to be structures in which the
sentences of the framework theory (such as the theory’s abstract calculus and its
general laws) are true (Frigg and Hartmann [2012], Sect. 1.3). Or, to state the
same point in more precise model-theoretic terms, models of a framework theory
consist of a domain of objects and an interpretation of the theory’s abstract cal-
culus and the laws over the domain (Chang and Keisler [1990], Sect. 1.3; Bell and
Slomson [1974], Sect. 3.2).4 Examples of empirically confirmed framework theories
include Newtonian Mechanics and Quantum Mechanics. Well-known examples of
models of framework theories are the model of a pendulum and models of planetary
motion (being examples of models of classical mechanics), and the Standard Model
of Particle Physics (being a model of quantum mechanics). Models of a theory
are constructed within a framework theory. Constructing such a model in order to
represent a target phenomenon often requires moving beyond the resources of the
framework theory: it consists in making a number of specific assumptions about
the target (Morgan and Morrison [1999]; Frigg and Hartmann [2012]).
With these conceptual tools in mind, we are now in a position to characterize
embedded toy models more precisely. Embedded toy models are (1) models of a
well confirmed framework theory, and (2) they are simple and idealized models of
phenomena.
Before we turn to a more detailed example of an embedded toy model, let us
add a note on terminology. We use the term “idealization” as an umbrella term for
(at least) two general kinds of idealizations that are usually distinguished in the
literature – Aristotelian and Galilean idealizations (Frigg and Hartmann [2012],
Sect. 1.1). A model involving an Aristotelian idealization “strips away” some fea-
ture(s) that the target system of the model in fact possesses (for instance, a model
of a pendulum strips away the color of the pendulum), or the model rests on the
assumption that some causal factor actually influencing the target system is absent
or “neutralized” (Ma¨ki [2011], p. 51). Aristotelian idealizations are also discussed
in terms of “abstraction” (Cartwright [1989]) and “isolation” (Ma¨ki [1992], [2011];
Hu¨ttemann [2004], [2014]). By contrast, Galilean idealizations deliberately dis-
4Although we rely on model theory to explicate the notion of a “model of a theory”, our
notion of embedding does not coincide with the model-theoretic notion of embedding, as, for
instance, Bell and Slomson ([1974], p. 73) define it.
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tort the target system, for instance, by making the assumption that agents are
perfectly rational, that the number of animals in a population or the number of
molecules in a gas goes to infinity, and so on (McMullin [1985]; Cartwright [1989];
Weisberg [2013]). Aristotelian and Galilean idealizations can co-occur in one and
the same model. The examples of toy models we discuss tend to involve both kinds
of idealizations.5
In this paper, our goal is not to highlight the differences between Aristotelian
and Galilean idealizations. For this reason, we will merely speak of “idealizations”
as an umbrella term throughout the remainder of the paper. Analogously, we will
use the term “de-idealization” to denote cases of both (Aristotelian) “de-isolation”
and (Galilean) “de-idealization”, to use Ma¨ki’s ([2011], p. 48) terminology. What
matters for our concerns is that modeling assumptions involving Aristotelian and
Galilean idealizations assert something that is literally false of the target system
(Cartwright [1983], p. 45). Or, put differently, models involving Aristotelian or
Galilean idealizations, prima facie, do not accurately represent their targets (for
instance, because they are not isomorphic to their targets, if that is what the
theory of representation requires).
Let us now turn to a concrete example of an embedded toy model. Consider
Newtonian Mechanics as a framework theory. This theory lays out a small number
of general laws (Newton’s laws of motion) and it provides the scientist with guide-
lines for the construction of concrete models for specific systems, or phenomena
(see Giere [1988]; Bailer-Jones [2009]). To study, for example, the motion of a
single planet around the Sun in our solar system, a number of model assumptions
have to be made. In the simplest case, one might want to study a system consisting
of only the Sun and the planet under consideration. Let us call this simple model
the “Sun-plus-one-planet model”. This model is a model of Newtonian mechanics
– the Sun-plus-one-planet model is a structure in which the sentences of Newtonian
mechanics (such as the theory’s abstract calculus and its general laws) are true.
Moreover, if one analyzes the Sun-plus-one-planet model as the model of a phe-
nomenon (for instance, of the Earth orbiting around the sun), this model involves
idealizations, because the modeler disregards the other planets, the moon(s), and
other stellar objects that are known to exist. Moreover, the model refers only to
gravitational interactions between the Sun and the planet. From Newton’s laws of
motion and the model assumptions, one can then derive the orbit of the planet.
In a simple calculation, which can be found in any textbook, one obtains that the
orbit of the planet is (approxiamtely) an ellipse with the Sun in one of the two
foci.
The Sun-plus-one-planet model is an embedded toy model, because: (1) it is a
5Models involving both Aristotelian and Galilean idealizations are sometimes called “carica-
ture models” in the literature – see Hartmann and Frigg ([2012], Sect. 1.1) for further references.
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model of a framework theory, Newtonian Mechanics, that is well confirmed, at least
in a particular domain of application, (2) it is simple, as it describes few causal, or
explanatory, factors (i.e. a physical system of only two interacting bodies), (3) it is
idealized (as it deliberately disregards the gravitational influence of other planets
and refers only gravitational interaction), (4) it is a model of a phenomenon (i.e.
a target phenomenon such as the earth orbiting around the Sun).
There are numerous examples of embedded toy models in physics (see Morgan
and Morrison 1999) including the Ising model of non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics, and the φ4-theory of quantum field theory (with quantum field theory as the
embedding framework theory). Hu¨ttemann ([2014]) provides another illustrative
example: he treats an oscillator and a rotator as embedded toy models with quan-
tum mechanics as the embedding theory. The ideal gas law can be understood as
the deductive consequence of a toy model that is embedded in statistical mechanics
(Strevens [2008], Chapter 8; Dizadji-Bahmani et al. [2010]).6 We will restrict our
discussion of embedded toy models to examples from physics. However, one may
also find embedded toy models in other disciplines. In the life sciences, Fisher’s
famous sex ratio model seems to be a toy model embedded into Darwinian evolu-
tionary theory (Sober [1984], pp. 51-8).
2.2 Autonomous toy models
Several well-known toy models are not embedded ones, i.e. they are not models of
a well confirmed framework theory. We call toy models of this sort “autonomous”
toy models. Autonomous toy models share the simple and idealized character
with their embedded cousins. The Schelling model of segregation and the Lotka-
Volterra model of predator-prey population growth are paradigmatic examples of
autonomous toy models (Schelling [1971]; Sugden [2000]; Weisberg [2007]).
A familiar paradigm: Schelling’s model of segregation. A paradigmatic
autonomous toy model is Thomas Schelling’s model of segregation. Schelling
([1971]) developed a famous toy model of the phenomenon of racial (and other
kinds of) segregation (see, for instance, Sugden [2000]; Weisberg [2013]). Racial
segregation is a general kind of phenomenon that is contingently instantiated in ac-
tual, or real-world, cities such as in Chicago and Detroit. Schelling’s model works
with a small number of simple assumptions: (1) two sorts of agents (for instance,
black and white agents) live in a very sparse environment (a two-dimensional grid),
6Thermodynamical models of phase transitions and of certain universal aspects of these phase
transitions are controversial cases. Whether these models are embedded models depends on
whether one believes that the thermodynamical description can be reduced to statistical me-
chanics. This is a controversial issue we cannot address in this paper (see Batterman [2002];
Butterfield [2011]; Norton [2012]).
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Figure 1: The Schelling model of segregation. The left hand side shows a random
distribution of agents. The right hand side depicts a pattern of segregation.
(2) the agents are assumed to be initially randomly distributed on the grid, and
(3) the agents interact in accord with a simple behavioral rule (for instance, each
agent moves to an empty spot in her/his neighborhood on the grid, if less than
about 30% of her/his neighbors do not have her/his color). If one starts with
randomly distributed agents (see Figure 1, on the left), then running this simple
model by reiterating the behavioral rules leads to the emergence of segregation af-
ter a small number of steps (see Figure 1, on the right). Schelling took the model
to explain that racial segregation can occur even if the agents do not have strongly
and explicitly racist attitudes (but merely conform to the 30% rule) and agents
would actually prefer to live in non-segregated cities. The model also allows us to
consider the consequences of varying initial conditions and the rules.
The Schelling model has racial segregation as its target phenomenon. As stated
above, racial segregation is general kind of phenomenon that is contingently in-
stantiated, for instance, in Chicago. If one takes the Schelling model to apply to
particular instantiations of racial segregation (for instance, the racial segregation
in Chicago in the 1960s), then the rules and other modelling assumptions are sim-
plified and idealized to such an extent that they do not accurately represent, say,
the preferences of the actual inhabitants of Chicago’s highly segregated neighbor-
hoods in the 1960s or in 2016. The model is simple in assuming a very sparse
environment (a grid) and agents that are characterized by very few properties
(most importantly, by their color and a behavioral rule). The model is idealized in
the following manner: for instance, (a) each agent is assumed to know how many
agents of each color live in her/his environment, (b) every agent is assumed to be
able to move whenever s/he is dissatisfied with the color of her/his neighbors, (c)
social and economic factors (such as education and income) are taken not to make
a difference at all, (d) the inhabitants of, say, Chicago and Detroit never were ran-
domly distributed, and so on (Schelling [1971], p. 149). Moreover, the Schelling
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model is not embedded into (that is, it is not a model of) an empirically confirmed
framework theory. In sum, we conclude that the Schelling model of segregation is
an autonomous toy model.
A novel case from econophysics: the DY-model. Econophysics is a fairly
young discipline that exploits mathematical models from statistical physics in or-
der to understand economic phenomena. One important class of econophysical
models, so-called “collision models”, depict economic exchanges among agents in
analogy with collisions of molecules in a gas, as described by statistical mechanics.
One influential and successful collision model in econophysics is the Draˇgulescu-
Yakovenko ([2000]) model (DY-model, for short). The model is taken to suc-
cessfully capture important qualitative features of the distributions of individual
monetary incomes found in many real economies – in particular, the ‘stylized fact’
that these income distributions are exponential distributions with a power law
tail. These features of income distributions are the target phenomenon for the
DY-model and, indeed, the DY-model successfully captures this phenomenon (see
Thebault et al. [forthcoming] for an in-depth discussion of the technical details
and the influence of the DY-model in econophysics).
The starting point for the DY-model is a population of ‘zero-intelligence’
agents. These agents have a single property: their money. The agents lack pref-
erences, expectations, rationality, and other properties of ‘real’ agents, at least as
portrayed by mainstream economics. At any given time t an agent i is associated
with a single property, their monetary income mi(t) (which is always non-negative,
so debt is not allowed). In the DY-model, one first assumes a large population
(i.e. N agents, with N  1), and then randomly selects two individuals at some
time t. For a selected pair of agents, the initial pre-interaction state can be char-
acterised completely in terms of two numbers: mi(t) which is the income of agent i
at time t; and mj(t) which is the income of agent j at time t. The DY-model treats
all interactions in the population in terms of binary exchanges of money in the
same way as in the kinetic theory of gases one can treat the interaction between
molecules in a gas in terms of binary exchanges of kinetic energy (see Thebault et
al. forthcoming). Another crucial assumption in the DY-model is that both the
total number of agents, N , and the total amount of money, M =
∑
imi(0), are
held fixed. That is,
∑
imi(0) =
∑
imi(t) for all t.
All of the assumptions regarding zero intelligence agents, a restriction to bi-
nary interactions, and the conservation of the total number of agents and the
total amount of money are clearly idealizations. Moreover, the DY-model is not a
model of a well confirmed framework theory, because statistical mechanics is not
a well confirmed theory for the domain of economic processes. In particular, the
DY-model does not include general dynamical laws of a well confirmed framework
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Figure 2: The exchange dynamics of the DY-model (from Thebault et al. [forth-
coming])
theory (for the relevant domain of application, i.e. economic processes) describ-
ing how the initial conditions of the agents determine the nature of the collisions
between agents. The DY-model rather rests on a formal analogy with certain
aspects of statistical mechanics.7 However, instead of drawing on some well con-
firmed framework theory, the DY-model pictures the agent-agent ‘collision’ with a
simple exchange mechanism, such that all the money of the two agents is pooled,
and then a random fraction is given to one, and the rest to the other (see Fig-
ure 2). This simple exchange mechanism thus leads to a post-interaction state
characterised by:
mi(t+ 1) = mi(t) + ∆m (1)
mj(t+ 1) = mj(t)−∆m (2)
where
∆m = ij[mi(t) +mj(t)]−mi(t) (3)
with ij a random variable uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, varying with
each discrete time-step, and labelled by the index of the two agents in the inter-
action (i.e. agents i and j).
In sum, we classify the DY-model as an interesting and novel exemplar of an
autonomous toy model, because (a) the DY-model relies on a strikingly simple
exchange mechanism, (b) it is idealized in assuming ‘their money’ as the agents
only characterizing property, that many-agent interaction do not occur, that the
number of agents and the amount of money is conserved, and so on, (c) it has a
target phenomenon (specific qualitative features of income distributions), and (d)
the DY model is not emdebbed into an empirically confirmed framework theory.
7For a detailed discussion of this point, see Thebault et al. ([forthcoming]).
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2.3 Qualification
Although the distinction between autonomous and embedded toy models is sharp,
the class of autonomous toy models is quite heterogeneous. This heterogeneity
exists because: (1) some autonomous models seem to bear no relevant relation
to a well confirmed framework theory (such as the Schelling model and the DY-
model, or so we assume). (2) However, other autonomous toy models are non-
trivially associated with a highly confirmed framework theory, but the toy model
in question is not a model of that framework theory.
Let us briefly present an examples illustrating the latter case, the MIT bag
model. For the MIT bag model, the relevantly associated (but not embedding)
framework theory is quantum chromodynamics (QCD) which is extremely hard
to solve in the low-energy domain (see Hartmann 1999). Here, QCD can only
be solved using high-powered computer simulations. These computational models
and computer simulations function like a black box and are, hence, not easy to
grasp and understand (we will return to the notion of grasping below). The MIT
bag model, on the other hand, identifies one crucial feature of QCD: it identifies
quark confinement as QCD’s key feature and models a hadron as a hard sphere in
which quarks move freely (see Figure 3 which depicts the “bag”, the freely moving
quarks in it, and arrows representing the confining force). It is important for our
concerns that the MIT bag model is not a model of QCD. The model is rather
“inspired” by QCD and it is ultimately justified by a story that connects the model
to QCD, as Hartmann ([1999], [2001]) argues.
However, in this paper, we will focus our discussion on embedded toy models
and autonomous toy models that are not connected to a theory via a story. We
will leave it for future research to address the question what kind of understanding
toy models such as the MIT bag model provide.
Figure 3: The MIT Bag Model (from Hartmann [1999], p. 336).
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3 A Theory of Understanding for Toy Models
Back to our main question: do toy models yield understanding? And, moreover, is
our taxonomy of autonomous and embedded toy models helpful for answering this
question? One promising and straightforward way to approach these questions
is to ask whether there is any convincing philosophical account of understanding
that applies to autonomous and embedded toy models. We take Henk De Regt
and Dennis Dieks’ influential account of scientific understanding (as developed in
De Regt and Dieks [2005]; De Regt [2009]) as our starting point. Presenting their
account (in Section 3.1) will primarily serve as a convenient way to (a) bring out
a number of common assumptions in several current accounts of understanding,
and (b) to motivate the account of understanding we will adopt, i.e. the refined
simple view (Section 3.2).
3.1 Preliminaries and requirements
According to De Regt and Dieks, “a phenomenon P can be understood if a theory
T of P exists that is intelligible (and meets the usual logical, methodological and
empirical requirements)” (De Regt and Dieks [2005], p. 150; see also De Regt
[2009], p. 32). Although De Regt and Dieks restrict their definition to theories,
their approach is intended to be more permissive, since they also refer to models
as vehicles of understanding. One of their central examples is a toy model, the
MIT bag model (De Regt and Dieks 2005: 155-156).
Let us examine De Regt and Dieks’ ([2005]) and De Regt’s ([2009]) necessary
conditions for understanding more closely: first, the explanation condition, second,
the “intelligibility” condition, and, third, the “usual logical, methodological and
empirical requirements”.
First, De Regt explicitly ties understanding to explanation: understanding
a phenomenon is characterized as“having an adequate explanation of the phe-
nomenon” and a “phenomenon P is understood scientifically if a theory of P exists
that is intelligible (and the explanation of P by T meets accepted logical and em-
pirical requirements” (De Regt [2009], p. 32, emphasis added). Hence, we take
it that having an explanation of P is a necessary condition for understanding P,
according to De Regt. We will refer to this condition as the “explanation condi-
tion”.
Second, De Regt and Dieks define a theory T as being intelligible for scien-
tists “if they can recognise qualitatively characteristic consequences of T without
performing exact calculations” (De Regt and Dieks [2005], p. 151). De Regt and
Dieks argue, for example, that physicists consider the kinetic theory of gases to be
intelligible iff the physicists are able to infer statements from the kinetic theory
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“without performing exact calculation”, such as the following statement: “if one
adds heat to a gas in a container of constant volume, the average kinetic energy
of the moving molecules – and thereby the temperature – will increase.” (De Regt
and Dieks [2005], p. 152) The intuition motivating the intelligibility requirement
is that “in contrast to an oracle [...] we want to be able to grasp how the predic-
tions are generated, and to develop a feeling for the consequences the theory has
in concrete situations.” (De Regt and Dieks [2005]. p. 143)
Third, what do De Regt and Dieks have in mind when referring to “the usual
logical, methodological and empirical requirements”? Although they do not make
this point explicit, we presume that they refer to familiar virtues of scientific the-
ories (or criteria for theory choice). Thomas Kuhn’s ([1977]) paper is the locus
classicus for an assessment of the “characteristics of a good scientific theory”:
“These five criteria – accuracy [corresponding to emprical adequacy], consistency,
scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness – are all standard criteria for evaluating the
adequacy of theory” (Kuhn [1977], p. 321). For this reason we, henceforth, re-
fer to these requirements as “Kuhnian criteria” for good scientific theories. De
Regt (2009) explicitly affirms this reading: the Kuhnian criteria determine the
‘goodness’ of a theory T (or a model M), on which the explanation of some tar-
get phenomenon T is based (De Regt [2009], p. 32). De Regt and Dieks’ main
motivation for demanding that intelligibility per se is not sufficient for scientific
understanding is that, for instance, astrology should not count as providing sci-
entific understanding, because, despite of being intelligible, astrology fails to be a
good theory (or model) if judged by Kuhnian criteria (De Regt and Dieks [2005],
p. 150).
De Regt and Dieks’ account of understanding is one of many possible starting
points in the large literature on understanding. However, what matters here is that
their account is, in several respects, a typical account of scientific understanding.
To bring out a number of common assumptions in several current accounts of
understanding (including early approaches by Friedman [1974] and Kitcher [1981];
more recently, among many others, by Trout [2002]; Strevens [2008], [2013]; and
the contributions in De Regt et al. [2009]), we will focus on the explanation
condition and the intelligibility condition. We will put aside the “the usual logical,
methodological and empirical requirements” (the Kuhnian criteria).
The common assumptions of these accounts of understanding can be charac-
terised as follows. An individual scientist understands some phenomenon P only
if three conditions are satisfied:
1. Explanation condition: There is a scientific explanation of P. Philosophers
concerned with understanding often differ with respect to their preferred the-
ory of explanation. They use different theories of scientific explanation such
as the covering-law account, the unification account, pragmatic accounts,
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and various causal accounts of explanation.8
2. Veridicality condition: In asserting that the understanding of phenomenon
P involves an explanation of P as a necessary condition, accounts of under-
standing inherit a feature of theories of explanation that we call the “veridi-
cality condition”. It is a common view that explanatory assumptions (that
is, the explanans of an explanation) are required to be true or, at least,
approximately true. Consider the following examples. Proponents of the
recently dominant causal accounts typically endorse this requirement: that
is, the explanans has to truthfully represent the causes of the explanandum
phenomenon. For instance, Woodward holds that the explanans has to“be
true or approximately so” (Woodward [2003], p. 203; Woodward and Hitch-
cock [2003], p. 6), and Strevens endorses the claim that the explanans is “a
veridical causal model” (Strevens [2008], p. 71) consisting of true causal laws
and true statements about initial conditions. Moreover, Hempel’s covering
law account demands that the explanans consist of true law statements and
true statements about initial conditions (Hempel [1965], p. 248, p. 338).
Unificationist accounts (Kitcher [1981], p. 519) and pragmatic accounts
(van Fraassen [1980], p. 143) also impose a veridicality constraint on the
explanans.9
3. Epistemic accessibility condition: If an individual scientist understands phe-
nomenon P, then she/he has epistemic access to an explanation of P. De Regt
and Dieks’ concept of intelligibility is one possible strategy of making precise
epistemic accessibility – to have epistemic access to a (toy) model, for them,
just is being able to recognise qualitatively characteristic consequences of
that model without performing exact calculations.
The differences between many competing accounts of understanding consist in
alternative ways of spelling out each of these three conditions.
Although De Regt and Dieks’ view is surely a useful starting point, their ac-
count says little about how understanding based on idealized models is possible.
8However, not everyone accepts that explanation is a necessary condition for understanding,
see, for instance, Lipton ([2009]) and Gijsbers ([2013]).
9The veridicality condition is logically independent from the Kuhnian criteria. The veridicality
condition and the Kuhnian criteria perform different roles in the philosophy of explanation (and
understanding). On the one hand, according to many standard accounts of explanation, the
veridicality condition is a necessary condition for distinguishing explanatory from non-explanatory
assumptions. On the other hand, the Kuhnian criteria allow us to draw a different distinction:
they enable us to discriminate how good different bodies of explanatory information are. In this
paper we will restrict our attention to the former issue. – Moreover, note that not everyone
accepts the veridicality condition as a requirement for a theory of explanation (see Cartwright
[1983], chapter 8).
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However, this is precisely the question we are concerned with. If one adopts De
Regt and Dieks’s account, toy models (and other idealized models) are problematic
in at least one respect: generally, toy models do not satisfy the veridicality condi-
tion. For instance, the DY-model is idealized, as it assumes that economic agents
are all identical, have no expectations and “zero intelligence”. This is certainly an
assumption that we deem (and surely hope) to be literally false. Hence, it is, at
least, questionable whether the veridicality condition is met (we will return to the
interpretation of idealizations in Section 4).
This observation raises a challenge if one seeks an account of understanding
applicable to toy models: such an account of understanding should accommodate
idealizations. Where does this leave us? One reaction to this challenge might be
to revise De Regt and Dieks’ account. We adopt an alternative strategy: we will
argue that the refined simple view is an account of understanding that provides a
strategy for addressing the challenge stemming from idealized models.
3.2 The refined simple view
Michael Strevens’ ([2013]) account of understanding offers a promising strategy for
avoiding the challenge from idealized models.
According to Strevens’ “simple view”, scientific understanding is defined as
follows: “An individual has scientific understanding of a phenomenon just in case
they grasp a correct10 scientific explanation of that phenomenon.” (Strevens [2008],
p. 3, [2013], p. 510) The notion of grasping is Strevens’ way of articulating the
epistemic accessibility condition. Strevens does not provide an informative defini-
tion of the concept of grasping. Instead he takes grasping to be a “fundamental
relation between mind and world, in virtue of which the mind has whatever famil-
iarity it does with the way the world is” (Strevens [2013], p. 511). One may be
concerned about the fact that grasping is taken as a primitive. We will return to
this issue shortly.
What is central for our present concerns is that the simple view offers a strategy
for dealing with the challenge from idealizations. Strevens ([2013], p. 512) is fully
aware of the fact that the simple view cannot be applied to idealized models
straightforwardly. The reason is that toy models are taken to be “literally” false,
while the simple view – implying the veridicality condition – requires them to
be true. As Strevens points out, most standard theories of explanation require
that the explanans be true or “veridical”. For instance, Strevens’ own kairetic
account of explanations, in its simplest form, requires that the explanans consist
of true causal laws and true statements about initial conditions (Strevens [2008],
10Strevens ([2013], p. 512) uses to notion of “correctness” to refer to the veridicality condition.
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pp. 71-2).11
Strevens accounts for idealized models in the following way: although idealized
statements are literal falsehoods (his terminology), these statements can be re-
interpreted – by using an account of idealizations – as being (approximately) true,
i.e. veridical. Strevens’ specific account of idealizations appeals to an “optimizing
procedure” (one vital component of his kairetic account) whose function is to filter
out, or to ignore, explanatorily irrelevant information that need not be explicitly
stated in the explanans (Strevens [2008], pp. 96-101). Making use of this idea of
ignoring explanatorily irrelevant information, Strevens ([2008], chapter 8, [2013],
p. 512) develops a minimalist account of idealizations. Strevens argues that the
minimalist account implies a veridical reading of idealized assumptions: idealized
assumptions truthfully (i.e. veridically) report which factors are irrelevant for the
explanation at hand.
The general lesson from Strevens’ minimalist approach is that, if understanding
involves idealized assumptions, then these assumptions ought to be re-interpreted
in a veridical way. Strevens’ minimalist approach does, however, not exhaust
the options. Other interpretations of idealizations include McMullin’s strategy,
dispositionalist interpretations and how-possibly interpretations. We will discuss
the minimalist view and its alternatives in Section 4.
Inspired by Strevens ([2013]), we start with the following working definition of
the concept of scientific understanding:
The simple view. An individual scientist S understands phe-
nomenon P via model M iff model M explains P and S grasps M.
Let us refine this working definition in four ways:
First, naturalism about grasping. If qualified properly, we are willing to follow
Strevens in assuming that grasping is a “fundamental relation between mind and
world”. For present purposes, we are prepared to accept that the notion of grasping
is philosophically primitive but not scientifically primitive. What does it mean to
take the notion of grasping as philosophically but not scientifically primitive? As
Bailer-Jones instructively points out,
“understanding has a subjective component, in addition to the publicly
accessible component represented by explanation, in the sense that un-
derstanding takes place in an individuals mind.” (Bailer-Jones [1997],
p. 122)
11Certain kinds statistical explanations require true statements about a probability distribution
over initial conditions (Strevens [2008], chapters 9-10).
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Following Bailer-Jones, we adopt a naturalistic approach to this subjective
component of understanding: that is, what grasping turns out to be is a scientific
matter – not a philosophical matter. The subjective component of understanding
can be studied by cognitive science. For example, cognitive science tells us that
grasping toy models sometimes consists in being able to visualize the behaviour of
the target system of a scientific toy model or to have a “mental model” of the toy
model and its solutions.12 Visualization and having a mental model are possible
ways, according to cognitive science, in which the grasping of a toy model can be
realized.13
Second, the contextual character of understanding. Understanding a phe-
nomenon is contextual: some model in, say, population ecology, may generate
understanding for an expert in this field but not for an expert in statistical physics
or a lay-person. We agree with De Regt and Dieks ([2005]) in assuming that the
individuals who gain scientific understanding are experts regarding the kind of
phenomenon that is understood. We express this thought by saying that an indi-
vidual scientist S understands a phenomenon P via model M in a context C, where
context C is a scientific discipline and S has expert knowledge of that discipline.
Third, different modalities of explanation and understanding. The kind of ex-
planatory information scientists receive from toy models is not always the same,
or so we will argue in Section 4. It is useful to distinguish two different modali-
ties of explanation: how-actually explanations and how-possibly explanations (see
Hempel [1965]; Gru¨ne-Yanoff [2009], [2013]). How-actually explanations possess
an explanans satisfying the veridicality condition, i.e. consisting of actually true
(or approximately true) statements. The explanantia of how-possibly explanations
refer to merely possible explanatory factors (for instance, to possible causes and
mechanisms bringing about the explanandum phenomenon, if the explanation is
causal). The distinction between how-possibly and how-actually explanations can
be acounted for by and integrated into many standard accounts of explanation –
for instance, with the covering-law account and various causal accounts of expla-
nations, such as Woodward’s seminal theory of causal explanation and Strevens’
kairetic account.
Fourth, neutrality with respect to different theories of explanation. In this pa-
per, we do not want to take a particular stance on which account of explanation
12See Giere ([1988]); Bailer-Jones ([1997], Chapter 5); and Hartmann ([1999]) regarding the
philosophical reflection of mental models in science. Bailer-Jones ([1997], Chapter 5) provides
numerous references to cognitive science research on mental models.
13Our naturalist stance towards grasping need not necessarily be at odds with De Regt and
Dieks’ notion of intelligibility. Sometimes, but not necessarily always, grasping may very well
consist in being able to draw “qualitative consequences” from a model, as De Regt and Dieks
claim. If that is what cognitive science confirms, we have no trouble accepting it, from a naturalist
point of view.
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is the most adequate one. Like Strevens ([2013], p. 510), we do not wish to tie an
account of understanding to one specific theory of explanation. We rather assume
here that (a) toy models have explanatory power of either a how-actually or a
how-possibly kind, and that (b) there is a philosophical account of explanation
that applies to toy models (for instance, by identifying merely possible or actual
causes if a causal account is adequate, and so on).14
Taking these four refinements into account, we arrive at a refined version of
the “simple view” that enables us to distinguish two sorts of understanding. The
refined simple view states:
The refined simple view. An individual scientist understands a phenomenon
P via model M in context C iff one of the following conditions holds:
1. A scientist S has how-actually understanding of phenomenon P via model M
in context C iff model M provides a how-actually explanation of P and S
grasps M.
2. A scientist S has how-possibly understanding of phenomenon P via model M
in context C iff model M provides a how-possibly explanation of P and S
grasps M.
Being able to distinguish between how-actually understanding and how-
possibly understanding will proof to be central in our discussion of understanding
in the context of autonomous toy models (Section 4.3).
In sum, the refined simple view is a promising candidate for analyzing the kind
of understanding that scientists acquire through toy models, because the refined
simple view has room for understanding via idealized models.
4 Two Kinds of Understanding With Toy Mod-
els
If one accepts the refined simple view, do scientists obtain understanding with toy
models? In this section, we will provide an answer in the form of the following
three claims:
1. An embedded toy model M yields how-actually explanations, if three condi-
tions hold: (a) the (well confirmed) embedding framework theory T permits
an interpretation and justification of the idealizations of M, and (b) this in-
terpretation and justification is compatible with the veridicality condition.
14We are sympathetic to broadly counterfactual accounts of explanation, such as Woodward’s
([2003]), Saatsi and Pexton ([2013]), and Reutlinger ([forthcoming]).
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If one grasps the how-actually explanation provided by an embedded toy
model satisfying the conditions (a) and (b), then one has how-actually un-
derstanding. (Section 4.1)
2. Some autonomous toy models do not provide how-actually understanding,
because major interpretations of idealizations (McMullin’s approach, mini-
malism and dispositionalism) do not support an interpretation and justifica-
tion of the relevant idealizations of these toy models that is compatible with
the veridicality condition. In other words, major interpretations of the rele-
vant idealizations do not support the claim that all autonomous toy models
provide how-actually understanding. (Section 4.2)
3. There are central examples of autonomous models that are best interpreted
as providing how-possibly explanations and, respectively, how-possibly un-
derstanding. This sort of understanding is valuable, because it has (what
we call) important modal, heuristic, and pedagogical functions in scientific
research and science education. (Section 4.3)
4.1 Embedded toy models and how-actually understanding
An embedded toy model M provides how-actually understanding, if the following
(sufficient) conditions hold, or so we argue: (a) the (well confirmed) embedding
framework theory T permits an interpretation and justification of the idealiza-
tions of M, and (b) this interpretation and justification is compatible with the
veridicality condition.
To see why, consider once more our example of the Sun-plus-one-planet toy
model. Recall from Section 2.1 that the Sun-plus-one-planet model is an embed-
ded toy model, because (1) it is the model of an empirically well confirmed – at
least within an appropriately restricted domain of application – framework theory
(Newtonian Mechanics), (2) it is simple (as it describes, for instance, a physical
system of only two interacting bodies), and (3) it is idealized (as it deliberately
disregards the influence of other planets and only takes into account their gravi-
tational interaction), and (4) it is a model of an actual target phenomenon (such
as the earth orbiting around the Sun).
The capacity of this model to provide how-actually understanding depends on
three conditions:
(a) In the case of this particular model, one possible way to interpret and justify
idealizations is McMullin’s account of idealizations (McMullin [1985]). Fol-
lowing McMullin’s strategy, we can consider the Sun-plus-one-planet model
to be at least approximately true of the target system – i.e. of the real orbit
of the earth around the sun. The idealizations of the model are justified
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pragmatically. That is, the purpose of idealizing is to turn the calculation of
the orbit into a mathematically tractable problem.
(b) McMullin’s strategy is compatible with the veridicality condition. We can
take the Sun-plus-one-planet model to be approximately true of the tar-
get system. Moreover, the Sun-plus-one-planet model can ultimately be
de-idealized. Newtonian mechanics provides the theoretical resources for
constructing a de-idealized model that generates more accurate predictions
about the target than the toyish Sun-plus-one-planet model. The framework
theory is a guide for scientists how to include the other planets and the
moon(s) and to eventually calculate the improved orbit of the planet under
consideration. Hence, in this particular case, the framework theory functions
as a guide to de-idealization (for a more detailed exposition and discussion
of this approach, see McMullin [1985]; also Weisberg [2013], p. 99). Hence,
McMullin’s strategy provides a way to defend the veridicality condition by
removing the idealizations.
Regarding condition (b), we hasten to stress that McMullin’s strategy is, of
course, not the only way to interpret and justify idealizations. (We also do not
endorse the strong claim that it is possible to de-idealize each and every idealiza-
tion.) In fact, other interpretative and justificatory strategies can be adopted to
complement McMullin’s strategy. In particular, we take minimalist and disposi-
tionalist accounts of idealizations to be promising complements, neither of which
necessarily involves de-idealization.
We will turn to a more detailed exposition of dispositionalism and minimal-
ism in Section 4.2. We will argue that these accounts of idealizations do not
warrant the claim that all autonomous toy models provide how-actually under-
standing. However, regarding embedded toy models, we adopt a different dialectic
strategy: for the sake of brevity, we mainly rely on the works of others who have
convincingly argued that dispositionalism and minimalism apply to embedded toy
models, if McMullin’s strategy does not. For instance, we assume as uncontrover-
sial Strevens’ ([2008]) minimalist approach to idealizations in statistical mechanics,
Hu¨ttemann’s ([2004], [2014]) argument in favor of dispositionalism regarding cer-
tain idealizations in quantum mechanics, and Thebault et al.’s ([forthcoming])
appeal to a combination of minimalist and dispositionalist strategies in the con-
text of statistical mechanics. Ultimately, our argument does not depend on the
strong assumption that all idealizations figuring in embedded toy models can be
given a veridical interpretation. Our main concern is merely a conditional one:
embedded toy models yield how-actually understanding, if some strategy for in-
terpreting and justifying idealizations is applicable and the result of applying the
strategy is compatible with the veridicality condition.
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In sum, we take embedded toy models to provide how-actually explanations,
if (a) the (well confirmed) framework theory permits or provides the means to
interpret and justify the idealizations and abstractions of the embedded toy model
(for instance, by appealing to McMullin’s strategy, minimalism, or dispositional-
ism), and (b) this interpretation and justification does not violate the veridicality
condition. Although a discussion of further examples clearly exceeds the scope of
this paper, we are confident that the same treatment applies to other examples
of embedded toy models (see Section 2.1), such as the Ising model, the φ4-theory,
and, perhaps, Fisher’s sex ratio model.
4.2 Against a how-actually interpretation of all au-
tonomous toy models
One might hold the view that not only embedded but also autonomous toy models
yield how-actually understanding and how-actually explanations. However, major
accounts of idealizations (McMullin’s strategy, minimalism, and dispositionalism)
do not support the claim that all autonomous toy models provide how-actually
understanding.
Prima facie, one possible way to argue for the claim that autonomous toy mod-
els yield how-actually understanding consists in relying on McMullin’s strategy.
However, McMullin’s strategy heavily depends on the existence of a more general
and well confirmed framework theory guiding the de-idealization process. But it
is precisely this theory that does not exist in the case of autonomous models. For
this reason, McMullin’s strategy is a non-starter for someone who wishes to defend
the claim that autonomous toy models provide how-actually understanding. (But
see below for a qualification regarding different de-idealization strategies in the
context of autonomous toy models).
In the current literature, there are two main alternatives to McMullin’s strat-
egy: minimalism and dispositionalism. If applicable, both minimalism and dis-
positionalism entail that idealized (toy) models provide how-actually information
about their target system. We will first introduce the two accounts of idealizations,
and then determine whether these accounts are applicable to all autonomous toy
models.
1. Minimalism: The minimalist view of idealized models is one promising strat-
egy for supporting an how-actually interpretation of autonomous toy mod-
els. As introduced in Section 3.2, Strevens relies on the minimalist view
to apply his simple view of understanding to idealized models (see Strevens
[2008], Chapter 8, [2013], p. 512).15 According to minimalism, idealized
15See Batterman ([2002]), Pincock ([2012]), and Batterman and Rice ([2014]) for other assess-
ments of minimalism.
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models truthfully represent two kinds of facts: (i) facts about a minimal set
of explanatorily relevant factors including true causal laws and true state-
ments about initial conditions (which are determined by Strevens’ optimizing
procedure), and (ii) the fact that some factor is not explanatorily relevant
(Strevens [2008], pp. 315-29; Weisberg [2013], pp. 100-3). According to
Strevens, idealized assumptions represent the latter kind of fact. If the min-
imalist interpretation applied to autonomous toy models, then such models
would provide how-actually understanding about the minimal set of factors
explaining the target phenomenon.
2. Dispositionalism: According to dispositionalism, an idealized model truth-
fully represents the disposition of a (physical, biological, or economic) sys-
tem to behave if other disturbing causes were absent (Cartwright [1989];
Hu¨ttemann [2014]). That is, an idealized assumption describes a counterfac-
tual situation in which a particular factor is taken to be absent (although it
frequently occurs in actual situations) and the target system is isolated from
the influence of that particular factor. If the dispositionalist interpretation
applied to autonomous toy models, then such models would provide how-
actually understanding about the actual disposition of the target system.16
Now, let us check whether minimalism or dispositionalism can be applied to
autonomous toy models.
Let us consider minimalism first. Strevens ([2008], Section 8.3) argues that the
idealizations figuring in statistical mechanics (embedding the ideal gas law) can
be interpreted in accord to the minimalist interpretation, i.e. as statements about
what does not make a difference for the occurrence of the target phenomenon.
For present purposes, we have no qualms with this particular example. However,
the same does not seem to hold for the Schelling model and the DY-model – our
examples of autonomous toy models. If minimalism were true of the Schelling
model and the DY-model, then all of the idealized modeling assumptions would
have to refer to explanatorily irrelevant factors. But it is far from clear that this is
the case. Regarding the Schelling model, one cannot simply hold without further
argument that the following modeling assumption, among others, refer to explana-
torily irrelevant factors: (a) that every agent knows how many agents of each color
live in their environment and (b) that social and economic factors do not have an
16Although Ma¨ki ([1992], [2011]) agrees with Cartwright and Hu¨ttemann that many idealiza-
tions are “isolations”, his approach significantly diverges from dispositionalism. Ma¨ki’s advocates
a “functional decomposition approach” to scientific models, which comprises not only his view of
idealizations but also a pragmatically constrained theory of representation and a sophisticated
theory of truth. In this paper, we focus solely on the dispositionalists. A discussion of Ma¨ki’s
approach – that might well be an alternative to both minimalism and dispositionalism – will be
a task for future work.
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influence on segregation. In the case of the DY-model, it seems to be explana-
torily relevant, contrary to minimalism, (i) whether many-agent interactions (as
opposed to binary interactions) occur, (ii) whether the quantity of money is in-
deed conserved, and (iii) whether agents exchange all (as opposed to some) of their
money (Thebault et al. [forthcoming]). In sum, we think that minimalism does
not straightforwardly apply to two paradigm instances of autonomous toy models.
Thus, minimalism cannot be used to defend the claim that all autonomous toy
models provide how-actually understanding.17 (This result is, of course, not an
objection to minimalism as an account of idealizations.)
Now let us turn to dispositionalism. A dispositionalist asserts that, for in-
stance, the DY-model describes a disposition of agents to behave in the absence
of many-agent interactions and of rational expectation of agents. Similarly, a dis-
positionalist takes the Schelling model to apply if the causal influence of certain
economic factors (such as income) were absent and if there were no ignorance about
the color of other agents the neighborhood of each agent. Unlike the minimalist,
the dispositionalist is not committed to the claim that, for instance, many-agent
interactions or economic factors are explanatorily irrelevant. However, disposition-
alists face another problem: they have to justify how the DY-model is applicable in
‘non-ideal’ situations, i.e. in the actually quite frequent kind of situation, in which
many-agent interactions do in fact occur in economic exchanges, agents actually
have (more or less) rational expectations, economic factors do make a difference
for segregation, and so on. Meeting this challenge is difficult in the case of the
autonomous toy models, because, unlike in the case of embedded toy models, there
are no general dynamical laws (of a framework theory) that might help us to de-
termine what will happen if ‘disturbing factors’ are in fact present and, thereby,
guide the application of the model in a non-ideal situation.
Hu¨ttemann ([2014]) presents a dispositionalist response to this problem of non-
ideal situations. Hu¨ttemann’s solution to the problem invokes “laws of interaction”
and “laws of composition”. This response works well for many embedded toy
models – and indeed, in Hu¨ttemann’s main examples for laws of interaction and
composition are part of quantum mechanics as a framework theory. However,
autonomous toy models are typically not equipped with such laws. For this reason,
Hu¨ttemann’s defense of dispositionalism does not carry over to autonomous toy
models, at least not in general.
Thus, dispositionalism about idealizations cannot be readily used to defend the
claim that all autonomous toy models provide how-actually understanding.
In sum, there are some autonomous toy models for which the following holds:
17As a referee pointed out, one promising strategy for defending a minimalist approach to
the Schelling model might consist in exploiting the robustness of the model (see Muldoon et al.
[2012]). See Reutlinger and Andersen [unpublished] for a critical discussion of a particular kind
of robustness approach in the context of explanations.
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neither minimalism nor dispositionalism can be readily used for supporting the
view that these autonomous toy models yield how-actually understanding.
Let us qualify this claim in two ways.
First, we emphasize that we endorse an existential claim: there are some au-
tonomous toy models that do not provide how-actually understanding, because
McMullin’s strategy, minimalism, and dispositionalism do not support the claim
that all autonomous toy models provide how-actually understanding. We do not
defend the stronger claim that no autonomous toy model yields how-actually un-
derstanding.18
Second, we do not claim that it is impossible to de-idealize autonomous toy
models. In fact, we will briefly discuss an attempt to de-idealize the DY-model
in Section 4.3. What matters for our concerns is that the de-idealization in the
case of autonomous toy models is not guided by an embedding framework the-
ory; de-idealization, in this context, is rather a matter of empirically readjusting a
model. Autonomous toy models often serve the heuristic purpose of constructing
more ‘realistic’ and often (but not necessarily) also more complex models of the
target phenomenon. However, in cases where the construction of more realistic
and often (but not necessarily) also more complex autonomous models is possible,
these autonomous models tend to lose their ‘toy’ – that is, idealized and simple
– character. Especially the gain in complexity has an interesting effect: it dimin-
ishes the capacity of these models to provide understanding, because it is mainly
the simplicity of toy models that permits scientist to grasp them. Consider the
following example for illustrating this point. The sociologist Peter Hedstro¨m de-
veloped an empirically calibrated agent-based model to capture the phenomenon
of unemployment in the Stockholm metropolitan area during the period of 1993
to 1997 (Hedstro¨m [2005]).
Hedstro¨m’s agent-based model is an autonomous model and it is intended to
be a realistic (i.e. containing relatively few idealizations) and complex model: the
number of agents in this model is 87,924 and their states (such as age, marital sta-
tus, previous unemployment experiences, immigration background etc.) are sup-
ported by demographic data about 20 to 24 years olds in the Stockholm metropoli-
tan area in the time period at issue. According to the rules of this model, an agent
changes her/his state (from unemployed to employed) depending, for instance, on
how many of their neighbors are unemployed. Hedstro¨m’s model is autonomous
but it is not simple and not strongly idealized (if compared to the Schelling model).
Its lack of simplicity makes it unlikely (if not impossible) for researchers to cogni-
tively ‘grasp’ the model. Hence Hedstro¨m’s model does not satisfy one necessary
condition for understanding.
18See Strevens ([2003], Chapters 4 and 5), for potential candidates of such models from the
life and social sciences.
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One reaction to our line of argument might be to improve minimalism and
dispositionalism and to argue that these improved accounts of idealizations do in
fact apply to all autonomous toy models. We have no proof that this strategy
has got to be unsuccessful. However, we believe that the attempt to apply mini-
malism and dispositionalism to some autonomous toy models faces problems that
are serious enough to explore an alternative approach. This alternative approach
rejects the idea that all autonomous toy models provide how-actually understand-
ing. Autonomous toy models sometimes yield another kind of understanding:
how-possibly understanding.
4.3 The how-possibly interpretation of some autonomous
toy models
Let us suppose that there is a considerably large class of autonomous toy models
that cannot be interpreted as providing how-actually understanding – for the rea-
sons given in Section 4.2. We hold that the Schelling model and the DY-model are
members of this class. If some autonomous toy models fail to provide how-actually
understanding, what kind of understanding do they provide, if any?
Our proposal is to take those autonomous toy models to yield how-possibly
understanding. Applying the refined simple view, a scientist S has how-possibly
understanding of phenomenon P by using an autonomous toy model M in context
C iff M provides a how-possibly explanation of P and S grasps M. For instance, we
take the Schelling model to explain how it is possible that racial segregation occurs;
and we take the DY-model to explain how it is possible that income distributions
with specific qualitative features emerge. Both models only provide a potential
explanation of a general pattern (that is, segregation and a certain kind of income
distribution) and this pattern happens to be actually instantiated (for instance,
the pattern of segregation is actually instantiated in Detroit, and a certain kind of
income distrbution is contingently instantiated in the United States). Both models
(and the evidence we have) do not tell us whether they have correctly identified
the actually relevant explanatory factor(s).19
The question arises why scientists are interested in how-possibly understanding,
as one appears to gain considerably less from how-possibly than from how-actually
explanations. De Regt and Dieks, for example, are very quick in dismissing how-
possibly understanding as “mere intelligibility” (which is clearly intended as a
derogatory term) and in taking how-possibly understanding to be (necessarily) on
a par with pseudo-science, such as astrology (see Section 3.1). In fact, how-possibly
understanding plays a central and legitimate role in research and in science ed-
19See Forber ([2010]), Cuffaro ([2015]), and Fumagalli ([2015]) for a sophisticated discussion
of various readings of how-possibly explanations.
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ucation. More precisely, we hold that there are at least three central epistemic
functions of how-possibly understanding: (1) the modal function, (2) the heuris-
tic function, and (3) pedagogical function. We will now describe each of these
functions in more detail.
(1) Modal function. How-possibly explanations are valuable if the phenomenon
to be understood is a ‘modal phenomenon’ – that is, if scientists want to un-
derstand whether and why some phenomenon is possibly or necessarily the case
(Gru¨ne-Yanoff [2013], pp. 855-9; Weisberg [2013], pp. 118-9; Cuffaro [2015]). One
of the most famous illustrations of the modal function of toy models is Schelling’s
model of segregation. Schelling’s model is concerned with the question whether
it is possible to understand the emergence of segregated neighbourhoods without
assigning explicitly racist attitudes to agents. Schelling’s model shows that, in
contrast to the view that segregation is necessarily a result of racism, it is possible
for segregation to arise in a population of agents following the 30% rule (even if the
agents would actually prefer to live in non-segregated cities). If the goal is to ex-
plain a ‘modal phenomenon’, then how-possibly understanding (and explanation)
is an appropriate tool for achieving this goal.
(2) Heuristic function. How-possibly understanding via autonomous toy mod-
els is not always an end in itself. How-possibly understanding often plays a heuris-
tic role in the process of constructing less idealized (and often, but not necessarily,
also more complex) models that latch onto the target system more accurately
than the original toy model (Hartmann [1995]).20 For instance, the DY-model
has inspired the construction the CCM-model. The latter model includes a ‘de-
idealization’ of the idealized assumption (in the DY-model) that the agents ex-
change all of their money when interacting. Unlike the DY-model, the CCM-model
assigns a saving propensity to all agents – that is, the agents exchange only a frac-
tion of their money when interacting, as in ‘real’ economic exchanges. This small
alteration comes with a considerable pay-off: the CCM-model captures the rele-
vant data about income distributions more accurately than the original DY-model
(Thebault et al. [forthcoming]). Hence, the DY-model – an autonomous toy model
– plays a heuristic role in developing a more accurate model (the CCM-model).
(3) Pedagogical function. The how-possibly character of autonomous toy mod-
els is often also used for primarily illustrative purposes in science education (see
Hangleiter [2014]). These models enable students and researchers to quickly grasp
the idea behind the solution to a problem, or the description of a phenomenon.
Generally speaking, the pedagogical function of toy models is to enable students
to learn how to calculate with and how to use a particular model (or theory).
20Fumagalli ([2015], Sect. 4.3) defends the claim that (autonomous) toy models can play a
heuristic role for constructing how-actually models only if modelers include veridical “additional
information or presuppositions” concerning the target system.
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Once students have learned how to calculate by practicing with a toy model, the
training is put to different uses in the case of embedded toy models and of au-
tonomous toy models. Regarding embedded toy models, science students learn
how to calculate with the embedding framework theory (by practicing with toy
models initially) in order to prepare the students to mathematically handle less
idealized (and sometimes also more complex) models of the embedding framework
theory later on. Regarding autonomous toy models, the goal of practicing with a
toy model is different: the acquired ability to handle an autonomous toy model
mathematically enables students to make use of the toy model in a modal or a
heuristic function.
To sum up, we have argued that some central examples of autonomous toy mod-
els yield how-possibly understanding (as opposed to how-actually understanding).
Moreover, we claimed that scientists value how-possibly understanding because
it has a modal and a heuristic function in scientific research, and a pedagogical
function in science education.
5 Conclusion
Initially, we characterized toy models as idealized and simple models of natural
and social phenomena. Our main question in this paper was whether the epistemic
goal of constructing toy models is to obtain understanding of their target phenom-
ena. To support the claim that toy models do indeed provide understanding, we
have argued in three steps: first, we introduced and illustrated a distinction be-
tween embedded and autonomous toy models. Second, we argued that the refined
simple view is a suitable account of understanding in the context of toy models.
One key feature of this account of understanding is that it allows for a distinction
between how-actually and how-possibly understanding. Finally, we applied the re-
fined simple view to our examples of embedded and autonomous toy models with
the following results: (a) an embedded toy model yields how-actually understand-
ing, if certain conditions regarding the veridical interpretation and justification of
the model’s idealizations are satisfied, (b) McMullin’s strategy, minimalism, and
dispositionalism do not support the claim that all autonomous toy models pro-
vide how-actually understanding, and (c) some autonomous toy models are best
interpreted as providing how-possibly understanding. Therefore, the claim that
toy models yield understanding can be vindicated, if one allows for two modalities
of understanding – that is, how-actually understanding and how-possibly under-
standing.
28
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Seamus Bradley, Adam Caulton, Henk de Regt, Maria
Kronfeldner, Sebastian Lutz, Margaret Morrison, John Norton, Michael Strevens,
Karim Thebault, David Weberman, and the participants of the workshop “Just
Playing. Toy Models in the Sciences” (held in Munich, 2015) as well as audiences
in Budapest, Cardiff, Munich, Paris, Santiago de Chile, Seattle, and Tu¨bingen for
their supportive and constructive comments. We wish to stress that the two anony-
mous referees for this journal did a wonderful job; we are grateful for their careful
and well-informed critical comments that truly helped to improve the paper. We
would also like to acknowledge the financial support of the Alexander von Hum-
boldt foundation, the Mu¨nchner Universita¨tsgesellschaft, and the Studienstiftung
des deutschen Volkes.
Alexander Reutlinger
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Munich
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
80539 Munich
Germany
Alexander.Reutlinger@lmu.de
Dominik Hangleiter
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Munich
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
80539 Munich
Germany
and
Dahlem Center for Complex Quantum Systems
Freie Universita¨t Berlin
14195 Berlin
Germany
Dominik.Hangleiter@fu-berlin.de
Stephan Hartmann
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Munich
29
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
80539 Munich
Germany
Stephan.Hartmann@lmu.de
30
References
Bailer-Jones, D. [1997]: Scientific Models: A Cognitive Approach with an Appli-
cation in Astrophysics, PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge.
Bailer-Jones, D. [2009]: Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
Batterman, R. [2002]: The Devil in the Details, New York: Oxford University
Press.
Batterman, R. and Rice, C. [2014]: ‘Minimal Model Explanation’, Philosophy of
Science, 81, pp. 349-376.
Bell, J. L. and Slomson, A. B. [1974]: Models and Ultraproducts: An Introduction,
New York: Dover Publications.
Butterfield, J. [2011]: ‘Less is Different: Emergence and Reduction Reconciled’,
Foundations of Physics, 41, pp. 1065-1135.
Cartwright, N. [1983]: How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Cartwright, N. [1989]: Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Chang, C. C. and Keisler, H. J. [1990]: Model Theory, Amsterdam: North Hol-
land.
Cuffaro, M. [2015]: ‘How-Possibly Explanations in (Quantum) Computer Sci-
ence’, Philosophy of Science, 82, pp. 737-748.
De Regt, H. and Dieks, D. [2005]: ‘A Contextual Approach to Scientific Under-
standing”, Synthese, 144, pp. 137-170.
De Regt, H. [2009]: ‘Understanding and Scientific Explanation’, In De Regt,
H., S. Leonelli and K. Eigner (eds), Scientific Understanding. Philosophical
Perspectives, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 21-42.
De Regt, H., Leonelli, S. and Eigner, K. (eds) [2009]: Scientific Understanding.
Philosophical Perspectives, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Dizadji-Bahmani, F., Frigg, R., and Hartmann, S. [2010]: ‘Who’s Afraid of
Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 73, 393-412.
31
Draˇgulescu, A. and Yakovenko, V. [2000]: ‘Statistical Mechanics of Money’, The
European Physics Journal B – Condensed Matter and Complex Systems,
17(4), pp. 723-729.
Forber, P. [2010]: ‘Confirmation and explaining how possible’, Studies in History
and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 41(1), pp. 32-40.
Friedman, M. [1974]: ‘Explanation and Scientific Understanding’, Journal of Phi-
losophy, 71, pp. 5-19.
Frigg, R. and Hartmann. S. [2012]: ‘Models in Science’, in E.N. Zalta (ed.),
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), URL =
¡http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/models-science/¿.
Fumagalli, R. [2015]: ‘Why We Cannot Learn from Minimal Models’, Erkenntnis,
Online First, DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9749-7.
Giere, R. [1988]: Explaining Science. A Cognitive Approach, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Gijsbers, V. [2013]: ‘Understanding, Explanation, and Unification’, Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44(3), pp. 516-522.
Gru¨ne-Yanoff, T. [2009]: ‘Learning from Minimal Economic Models’, Erkenntnis,
70(1), pp. 81-99.
Gru¨ne-Yanoff, T. [2013]: ‘Appraising Non-Representational Models’, Philosophy
of Science, 80(5), pp. 850-861.
Hangleiter, D. [2014]: When Scientists Play: How Toy Models in Science Help
Us Understand the World, Bachelor Thesis, LMU Munich.
Hartmann, S. [1998]: ‘Idealization in Quantum Field Theory’, In N. Shanks (ed.),
Idealization in Contemporary Physics, Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 99-122.
Hartmann, S. [1999]: ‘Models and Stories in Hadron Physics?’, In M. Morgan and
M. Morrison (eds.), Models as Mediators, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 326-346.
Hartmann, S. [2001]: ‘Effective Field Theories, Reduction and Scientific Expla-
nation’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, Part B, 32,
pp. 267-304.
32
Hedstro¨m, P. [2005]: Dissecting the Social, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Hempel, C. [1965]: Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the
Philosophy of Science, New York: Free Press.
Humphreys, P. [2004]: Extending Ourselves, New York: Oxford University Press.
Hu¨ttemann, A. [2004]: What’s Wrong With Microphysicalism?, London: Rout-
ledge.
Hu¨ttemann, A. [2014]: ‘Ceteris-paribus Laws in Physics’, Erkenntnis, 79, pp.
1715-1728.
Kitcher, P. [1981]: ‘Explanatory Unification’, Philosophy of Science, 48, pp. 507-
531.
Kuhn, T. [1977]: ‘Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice’, In his The
Essential Tension, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 320-339.
Lipton, P. [2009]: ‘Understanding Without Explanation’, In De Regt, H., S.
Leonelli and K. Eigner (eds), Scientific Understanding. Philosophical Per-
spectives, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 43-63.
Ma¨ki, U. [1992]: ‘On the Method of Isolation in Economics’, Poznan Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 26, pp. 319-354.
Ma¨ki, U. [2011]: ‘Models and the Locus of their Truth’, Synthese, 180, pp. 47-63.
McMullin, E. [1985]: ‘Galilean Idealizations’, Studies in the History and Philos-
ophy of Science, 16, 247-273.
Meinel, C. [2004]: ‘Molecules and Croquet Balls’, In S. de Chadarevian and N.
Hopwood (eds), Models. The Third Dimension of Science, Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, pp. 242-275.
Morgan, M. and Morrison, M. (eds) [1999]: Models as Mediators, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Muldoon, R., Smith, T., and Weisberg, M. [2012]: ‘Segregation that No One
Seeks’, Philosophy of Science, 79, 38-62.
Norton, J. [2012]: ‘Approximation and Idealization: Why the Difference Mat-
ters?’, Philosophy of Science, 79, pp. 207-232.
33
Pincock, C. [2012]: Mathematical and Scientific Representation, New York: Ox-
ford University Press.
Reutlinger, A. [forthcoming]: ‘Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Non-
Causal Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation’,
Philosophy of Science.
Reutlinger, A. and Andersen, H. [unpublished]: ’Abstract Isn’t Non-Causal’.
Saatsi, J. and Pexton, M. [2013]: ‘Reassessing Woodward?s account of explana-
tion: regularities, counterfactuals, and non-causal explanations’, Philosophy
of Science, 80, pp. 613-624.
Schelling, T. [1971]: ‘Dynamic Models of Segregation’, Journal of Mathematical
Sociology, 1, pp. 143-186.
Sober, E. [1984]: The Nature of Selection, Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press.
Strevens, M. [2003]: Bigger Than Chaos, MA: Harvard University Press.
Strevens, M. [2008]: Depth, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Strevens, M. [2013]: ‘No Explanation without Understanding’, Studies in History
and Philosophy of Science, 44, pp. 510-515.
Sugden, R. [2000]: ‘Credible Worlds: the status of theoretical models in eco-
nomics’, Journal of Economic Methodology, 7, pp. 1-31.
Thebault, K., Bradley, S., and Reutlinger, A. [forthcoming]: ‘Modeling Inequal-
ity’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science.
Trout, J. [2002]: ‘Scientific Explanation and the Sense of Understanding’, Phi-
losophy of Science, 69, pp. 212-233.
Van Fraassen, B. [1980]: The Scientific Image, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weisberg, M. [2013]: Simulation and Similarity, New York: Oxford University
Press.
Woodward, J. [2003]: Making Things Happen, New York: Oxford University
Press.
34
